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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals in Section 
78-2a-3 of the Utah Code. 
MATVRS Of THE PPQggEDTNGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of criminal 
conviction on June 16, 1989 imposed after jury trial by the Third 
Circuit Court, Sandy Department, Honorable Robin W. Reese 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT 
FAILS TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
II. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE SECTION 3-1-
14 FOR VAGUENESS WHEN HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ORDINANCE 
15 VAGUE AS TO HIS CONDUCT. 
III. WHETHER SECTION 3-1-14 IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT'S 
STATEMENT INTO EVIDENCE. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City. Section 3-1-14. 
(a) Attacking dogs. It shall be unlawful for the owner 
or person having charge, care, custody or control [of] any dog 
to allow such dog to attack, chase, or worry any person, any 
domestic animal having a commercial value, or any species of 
hoofed protected wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl. Worry 
as used in this section shall mean to harrass [sic] by 
tearing, biting or shaking with the teeth. 
(b) Owner liability. The owner in violation of 
subsection (a) above shall be strictly liable for violation 
of this section. In addition to being subject to prosecution 
under subsection (a) above, the owner of such dog shall also 
be liable in damages to any person injured or to the owner of 
any animal(s) injured or destroyed thereby. 
(c) Defenses. The following shall be considered in 
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mitigating the penalties or damages or in dismissing the 
charge: 
(1) That the dog was properly confined on the 
premises• 
(2) That the dog was deliberately or maliciously 
provoked. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On January 27, 1989, Sandy City charged the defendant by 
Information with Dog Attacking Persons or Animals under Sandy City 
Ordinance 3-1-14. 
2. The date of the violation was December 24, 1988. The 
transcript before the Court of Appeals contains no evidence 
concerning the events of that date nor any evidence of events 
previous to that date concerning the ownership of the dog. 
3. After the date of violation but before the charge was 
filed, Diana Albrand, a Sandy City animal control officer, called 
the defendant and inquired as to a convenient time that a 
representative from animal control could come to the defendant's 
home or work to speak with him. Because of scheduling conflicts, 
the defendant agreed to come to the animal control office to fill 
out a statement. Transcript, p. 6, 
4. When he arrived at the office, Diana Albrand told him that 
he was under no obligation to write the statement and clarified 
this position by giving the defendant a partial Miranda warning. 
The defendant was not placed under arrest and was free to leave at 
any time. Transcript, p. 6-7, 17. 
5. The defendant told the officer that his dog had been 
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running between his residence and a Mrs. Mauldin's and then 
expressed confusion about what to write in the statement. The 
officer responded, "Just write what happened and, you know, who 
owns the dog and who doesn't own the dog." Transcript, p. 7. 
6. The officer went into a back room to do other work while 
the defendant filled out the statement. When the defendant was 
finished writing the statement, he voluntarily handed it to the 
officer and, after the officer expressed appreciation, said "okay" 
and left. Transcript, p. 8. 
7. The case first came before the trial court on March 16, 
1989 for the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's written 
statement. The Honorable Philip K. Palmer denied the motion. 
8. The trial was heard by jury on June 16, 1989, the 
Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. The jury found the defendant 
guilty and the judge ordered restitution. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Brief of Appellant should be stricken under Rule 24 
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. The brief contains a 
number of factual allegations which are not supported by citations 
to the transcript. Furthermore, a complete transcript of the 
proceedings would show that some of these allegations are 
inaccurate. 
2. Even if the brief is not stricken, the defendant does not 
have standing to challenge Section 3-1-14 for vagueness. The 
litigant challenging a law must show that it is vague either in 
all its applications or at least as applied to the litigant's 
4 
conduct. The defendant has shown neither. 
Subsection (b) of the ordinance states clearly that owners of 
dogs are strictly liable for a violation of subsection (a) which 
prohibits dogs from attacking persons or other specified animals. 
The ordinance is, therefore# not vague in all its applications. 
Furthermore, the defendant has not shown that the ordinance is 
vague as to his conduct because there are no facts appropriately 
before the court upon which the court could reach that conclusion. 
3. Even if the defendant has standing to challenge the 
ordinance for vagueness, the ordinance is not vague. Subsection 
(a) gives notice to owners of a dog as well as people having 
charge# care, custody or control of a dog that they may not allow 
that dog to attack persons or animals. "Allow" is commonly 
understood to include passive conduct; it does not necessitate 
intent or knowledge. 
Thw average person would understand from the language of the 
ordinance that he is responsible for the conduct of his dog 
regardless of whether he was aware of the activities of dog. 
Otherwise, the purpose of the ordinance to protect the public 
welfare would be defeated. 
4. The written statement of the defendant was properly 
admitted by the trial court. The circumstances in which the 
statement was given were not subject to Miranda protections because 
they were neither custodial nor interrogative. The defendant came 
freely to the animal control office to give the statement, wrote 
the statement and offered it to the animal control officer freely, 
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and left the office freely. 
ARGlftJENT 
I. THE BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT IS 
DRAFTED IN VIOLATION OF RULE 24 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
The Brief of Appellant contains a number of factual 
allegations which are not supported by references to the record. 
This is not a matter of a simple failure to cite to facts contained 
in the transcript. The transcript excludes entirely the evidence 
leading to and on the date of the violation. Nevertheless, the 
defendant, in his Statement of the Case and elsewhere in his brief, 
liberally alleges facts from the trial without offering the court 
the benefit of determining their accuracy. The only portion of the 
brief which cites to the transcript is the section on the 
admissibility of the defendants statement. Brief of Appellant, 
p. 14-16. 
Rule 24(k) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals permits 
the court to strike briefs which are not drafted in compliance with 
the rules. The Brief of Appellant does not comply with Rules 
24(a)(7) and 24(e) which require facts to be supported by the 
record. When facts alleged on appeal are not supported by 
citations to the record, the reviewing court will assume the 
correctness of the ruling below. White River Shale Oil v. Public 
Service Commission, 700 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1985). 
Rule 24(k) also permits the court to strike briefs which 
contain inaccurate information. The defendant's version of the 
facts contains inaccuracies, but it is difficult for the plaintiff 
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to show these inaccuracies without the missing portions of the 
transcript. However, at least two examples of inaccuracy can be 
offered by way of the defendant's own written statement. Appendix 
1. 
The defendant states that he took his dog to animal control 
to be adopted or destroyed. Brief of Appellant, p. 4-5. This 
assertion is directly contrary to the defendant's own written 
statement that the dog "vanished" in September and then returned 
with a new collar and tag. Prosecution's Exhibit No. 7. The 
defendant also makes statements that leave an impression that after 
September the dog was with him only periodically. Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5. But these statements contradict the defendants 
admission that at some point he had the dog for a month and a half 
and that after this time he never had a problem with the dog— 
apparently a problem with him leaving—until December 25th when he 
disappeared. Prosecution's Exhibit No. 7. 
II. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE SECTION 3-
1-14 FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE 
ORDINANCE IS EITHER VAGUE IN ALL ITS APPLICATIONS OR VAGUE AS TO 
HIS CONDUCT. 
A person engaging in conduct which is clearly proscribed by 
a law in question "cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine 
the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law." Village of Hoffman v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982). The litigant asserting vagueness has 
the burden of showing that the law in question is vague either in 
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all its applications or at least as applied to the litigant's 
conduct. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Sections 12-32, at 
1036 (2d ed. 1988). 
The defendant has failed to show that the ordinance is vague 
in all its applications. The ordinance establishes clearly that 
an owner is strictly liable for a violation of the ordinance. 
Subsection (b) states that "the owner in violation of subsection 
(a) above shall be strictly liable under this section." Subsection 
(b) further clarifies that strict liability applies not only to 
damages but to prosecution for the offense itself: 
In addition to being subject to prosecution under 
subsection (a) above, the owner of such dog shall also 
be liable in damages to any person injured or to the 
owner of any animal(s) injured or destroyed thereby. 
In at least one circumstance, therefore, the ordinance is entirely 
clear. 
The defendant has also failed to show that the ordinance is 
vague as to his conduct. The transcript before the Court of 
Appeals excludes all testimony presented at trial. The record on 
appeal, therefore, is devoid of the facts which would allow the 
defendant to argue or the court to conclude that the ordinance is 
vague as to the defendant's conduct. 
Even if the application of the ordinance is limited to owners 
and the court accepts the defendant's allegation that he was not 
the licensed owner of the dog at the time of the offense, the 
defendant has failed to establish that he was not the owner as that 
term is commonly understood. Therefore, he has not shown, nor are 
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there sufficient facts for the court to find, that he was not the 
owner of the dog and thus not subject to the clear language of 
subsection (b). 
III. SECTION 3-1-14 IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE SUBSECTION 
(A) BOTH BY ITS LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY ON 
OWNERS AND OTHERS HAVING CHARGE, CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF A DOG. 
The central issue of this case is whether Section 3-1-14 is 
void for vagueness. All of the defendant's issues, except the one 
concerning the defendant's statement, can be answered by a 
resolution of the issue of vagueness. 
The standard in Utah for determining whether a law is void 
for vagueness is that the law must be "sufficiently explicit and 
clear to inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what 
conduct is prohibited." State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 
1987) . But in reviewing a law under this standard, the court must 
consider other important guidelines. 
First, "legislative enactments are accorded a presumption of 
validity." Hoffman, at 505. Second, "neither absolute exactitude 
of expression nor complete precision of meaning can be expected." 
State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981). It is not a 
defense, therefore, that on hindsight there may be other 
constructions of the law in question. 
Third, the degree of scrutiny with which a court considers a 
law depends on whether the law reaches constitutionally protected 
conduct. If its does, the degree of notice must be greater than 
for other conduct so that the there is no chilling effect on 
constitutionally protected activities. In such cases, the law is 
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subject to close judicial scrutiny. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379 (1979); Rotunda, Constitutional Law. Section 17.8, at 262, n. 
22 (1986). Laws related to activities which are not 
constitutionally protected are subject to a less strict test for 
vagueness. Flipside. at 498. 
Before examining the language contained in Section 3-1-14, it 
must be determined whether the law reaches constitutionally 
protected conduct. It does not. The purpose of dog control 
ordinances is to protect the public, not deprive one the right of 
property. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, Section 24.284 
(1989) . The mere fact that a law tangentially affects property 
does not invoke close scrutiny. Otherwise, economic regulations 
would not be subject to a less strict vagueness test. Flipside, 
at 498; See also United States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 
29, 36 (1963) (distinguishing the approach to a vagueness challenge 
in a case involving an economic regulation from the approach to 
cases arising under the First Amendment). 
The rights with which courts are most concerned under a claim 
of vagueness are those specifically protected by the constitution. 
The concern for a law which regulates speech, for example, is that 
uncertainties in the law may chill one's right to freedom of 
speech. It can hardly be said that any unclarity regarding a 
personfs responsibilities for restraining a dog produces a chilling 
effect on constitutional guarantees. 
Section 3-1-14 is clear that the owner of a dog is strictly 
liable if that dog attacks, chases, or worries a person or animal 
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specified in the ordinance* The question is whether a person 
having charge, care, custody, or control of the dog is also 
strictly liable. An analysis of this question must focus on 
Subsection (a): 
It shall be unlawful for the owner or person having 
charge, care, custody or control [of] any dog to allow 
such dog to attack, chase or worry any person, any 
domestic animal having a commercial value, or any species 
of hoofed protected wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl. 
Subsection (a) , even without the clarification added by 
Subsection (b) , is clear that people other than the owner, as 
specified in the ordinance, are strictly liable. The use of the 
word "allow" in subsection (a) does not leave confusion as to 
whether knowledge or intent is required. "Allow" means "to forbear 
or neglect to restrain." Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary 
(1983).1 "Allow," therefore, implies passive conduct, without the 
necessity of knowledge. This definition is apparent to the 
ordinary reader of common intelligence and such a reader would 
understand from the ordinance that he is responsible for the 
actions of his dog regardless of whether he had knowledge of those 
actions. 
In Village of Northbrook v. Cannon, 377 N.E.2d 1208 (111. App. 
1978), the defendant argued that the word, "permit," as used in a 
nuisance animal ordinance implied knowledge. The ordinance read: 
"It shall be unlawful for the owner or harborer of any dog, cat or 
other domestic animal to cause or permit such animal to perform, 
This source cites the following as an example of how the 
word may be used: "[allow] the dog to roam." 
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create or engage in any nuisance . • . ." The city argued that the 
ordinance was malum prohibitum and that no proof of intent was 
required. 
The case was decided not on the issue of vagueness but on the 
whether lack of knowledge was a defense. But the court made clear 
that the use of the words "permit" or "allow" did not necessary 
impose a requirement of intent. The court compared the ordinance 
in question to cases decided under state pollution control laws 
which used the word "allow" in relation to the release of 
pollutants. 
In those cases, the Illinois courts held that no mens rea was 
required. In comparing the pollution cases to the animal control 
ordinance, the court said: 
Each measure focuses on prevention of a harmful result 
which may be caused by the action of a range of persons 
from by-standers to those holding legal title to the 
pollutant or animal whose release would adversely affect 
the environment. Accordingly, both make punishable 
passive activity by person who obtain some benefit from 
the continued existence of the harmful agent. 
Id. at 1213. 
Similarly, it is clear that 3-1-14(a) imposes strict liability 
on a person who owns or has charge, care, custody or control of a 
dog which attacks a person or animal. The defendant suggests that 
"allows" means "that the owner or person in control of that animal 
knows what the dog is doing and is in a position to prevent such 
activity." Brief of Appellant, p. 9. Under this interpretation, 
only those rare cases could be prosecuted where the defendant was 
present at the time of the attack or there was other evidence that 
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he or she intended the result* The ordinance would have little 
effect in compelling people to control the dogs for which they are 
responsible* 
A reader of common intelligence would realize, therefore, not 
only by the common understanding of the word "allow" but by the 
obvious purpose of the ordinance, that the ordinance imposes strict 
liability. Any other reading would defeat the purpose of section 
3-1-14, as well as animal control ordinances in general—to compel 
those having responsibility to properly restrain their dogs to 
avoid the threat to public welfare of dogs running at large. 
Section 3-1-14(a) makes this purpose clear to owners of dogs as 
well as others who have charge, care, custody or control of a dog. 
Contrary to the defendants position, intent is not an element 
of all criminal offenses. Malum prohibitum crimes do not require 
intent. Salt Lake City v. Ronnenburq. 674 P.2d 128, 129 (Utah 
1983). These types of crimes are generally "enactments passed as 
police measures, regulating statutes, or statutes enacted for the 
protection of public morals, public health, and the public peace 
and safety." 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section 30. 
Factors which favor a strict-liability construction of a law 
are that the offense "creates a danger or probability of injury 
which will be the same without regard to intent; that an intent or 
scienter requirement would obstruct the purpose of the statute or 
make it difficult to enforce; and that the accused, even if he does 
not will the violation, is usually in a position to prevent it with 
no more care than society might reasonably expect." 21 Am. Jur. 
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2d. Criminal Law, Section 139. The ordinance in question fulfills 
each one of these criteria. 
In summary, Section 3-1-14 is not void for vagueness because 
the ordinance is clear to both owners of dogs and others having 
charge, care, custody or control of a dog that they are strictly 
liable for the actions of the dog in violation of the ordinance. 
Because the language of the ordinance is clear, the defendant had 
adequate notice of the prohibited conduct and the trial judge was 
correct in applying strict liability to both owners and 
custodians.2 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT 
INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE STATEMENT WAS 
MADE WERE NEITHER CUSTODIAL NOR INTERROGATIVE. 
On December 29, 1988, previous to charges being filed, the 
defendant filled out a written statement which the plaintiff 
introduced at trial. Defendant claims that this statement should 
have been excluded because he was not informed of his Miranda 
rights. The statement of the defendant introduced into evidence 
at trial was given under circumstances to which Miranda rights 
would not apply: the statement was made under conditions which 
were neither custodial nor interrogative. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). 
In State v. Shuman. 639 P.2d 155 (Utah 1981), the defendant 
called his probation officer to report that he thought he might 
The plaintifffs proposed instruction included owners and 
person having charge, care, custody or control. The trial judge 
determined that it was necessary to instruct only as to owners and 
custodians. 
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have killed someone. Officers arrived at the defendant's apartment 
to investigate. They found no evidence of a crime, but eventually 
the defendant was asked to come to the sheriff fs office for further 
investigation. He went there willingly. In response to a question 
asked by the sheriff, the defendant admitted to having been with 
the victim and having been in an argument. 
Eventually, after further evidence was obtained and the 
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights he confessed to killing 
the victim. The defendant sought to suppress his pre-Miranda 
statements. The Utah Supreme Court held that Miranda was not 
controlling because the defendant was not in custody, or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom in a significant way, prior to having been 
read his rights: he had willingly accompanied the deputy to the 
sheriff's office; he was not under arrest; he was given no 
indication that he would be retrained from leaving. Id. at 157. 
Similarly, the defendant in the case at hand was not in 
custody. He came to the office of Sandy City Animal Control after 
an animal control officer called and asked him to come fill out a 
witness statement. The appointment was set at the defendant's 
convenience. Transcript, p. 6. When he arrived, he came freely 
through the front door to the desk where he filled out the 
statement. Transcript, p. 16-17. He was not placed under arrest. 
Transcript, p. 6. And he was never told he could not leave. 
Transcript, p. 17. Even if the defendant had been a suspect at 
this time, and is not clear that he was, "a noncustodial situation 
is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because the 
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questioned person is one whom the police suspect." State v. Cole, 
674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, the environment in which the defendant wrote his 
statement was not interrogative. The officer told the defendant 
that he was not "obligated to write the statement." Transcript, 
p. 6. In fact, she give him a partial Miranda warning to stress 
that he did not have to write the statement. When the defendant 
expressed some confusion about what to right in the statement, the 
only guidance the officer offered was "Just write what happened 
and, you know, who owns the dog and who doesnft own the dog." 
Transcript, p. 7. 
While the defendant was writing the statement, the officer was 
in the back room "answering phones and such." Transcript, p. 8. 
The defendant even admitted that he did not write the statement in 
response to any direct line of questioning: "As she said, I didnft 
know what to put down and she just said to put something down, so 
I did." Transcript, p. 15. When the defendant was finished 
writing the statement he voluntarily gave it to the officer and 
left. Transcript, p. 8. It would be difficult to argue that these 
circumstance rose to a level of constitutional protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The Brief of Appellant should be stricken because is fails to 
comply with Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Furthermore, the defendant does not have standing to challenge 
Sandy City Ordinance 3-1-14 because he has not shown that the 
ordinance is either vague in all its applications or vague as to 
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the his conduct. Even if the defendant has standing to challenge 
section 3-1-14, the ordinance is not vague. Section 3-1-14(a), 
both by its language and purpose, imposes strict liability on 
owners and people having charge, care, custody or control of a dog. 
The trial judge, therefore, was correct in instructing the jury 
that both owners and custodians were strictly liable. The trial 
judge was also correct in admitting the statement of the defendant. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Dated this lifly day of February, 1990. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Clifford W. Lark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ll day of February, 1990 I 
mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, by 
certified mail, to: 
David K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 280 
310 East 4500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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APPENDIX 
Prosecution's Exhibit No. 7, Witness Statement, Jerry Rooks. 
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SEX M AGE /-r-^V TELEPHONE NUMBER $~~-7/-*?<fr>^ 
DESCRIBE WHAT YOU SAW: TL &e<n*g.cP Q g k g J A <> QOy / *" t -*^7 W o 
1 - ) M q . OUe-ai u>g, -C» r-??T G>oT fcl^v^ k^Q- Q - T I Q - ^ T < 2 ^ 
Co<n &iaTf<s~.cP cs-C T > g ; K G <4%"^ i M J > - U A fe^Pg.» -4-V<3/v\ 
cPo^ ,^ , - . T ^ . > Ti 'moi ^ V ) ' ^ . U A M t ^ ^ P , 31 ^fg,<^T~ 
' R-Pr-^vr. A c j e « j - £ "SQ-ArcU» C A P A t ) S-tkCt^.^3 ' m Tv^ -g^ 
m\\(o.^. ftaVpoA fcootd) MaT" &<^ lo^AT<a.cP- A?co-<-
A. m<ax(tM *- A 4 A ) - P &<?W-g. Go.tur»lQ.cfl. QT THi S 
^.q.r-O c J o c f „ :£ ? < \ > c g g c j ^ c f T o &S»-S<g^rc./-/ l U - f p 
1-^ratf^fJ. tte.T T 4 G . -£" ^ g A r i i J c / / A T W ' - S T</»*^4_3 
AoJcP ^MIQ.U <*4 TU<-*J A/OJ) & Q , O » J A c f e p T ^ c D fey 
"7^ 
SANDY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
598 EAST 9400 SOUTH 
SANDY, UTAH 84070 (801) 572-1211 
WITNESS STATEMENT 
DATE. 
.OCATION. 
.TIME OF OCCURRENCE. .CASE*. 
SEX _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AGE 
AnnRFfiS f - * a ~ *?<r&d> g o 
TELEPHONE NUMBER _ _ Z £ _ _ _ _ _ 
DESCRIBE WHAT YOU SAW: <S*J<3 ^A*J l tcg , M^?<4)Q^LJ «• X - j - i l ^ * - * 
R .^V6oA i W D *54Uu><>r£) o ^ . 31' A l s o -P^o^rD P o t ^ 4 a T 
tffcs>»**j^Wgi 
^o^c/Ya^A A.*-i$ t tJ-£*r> **/}'• cr-P .sat J? < M s e . / a ^ j T". 
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